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THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 
Todd]. Zywicki* 
DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA. 
By David A. Skeet, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001. Pp. 
xi, 281. $35. 
As this Review was being written, Congress· once again failed to 
pass the bipartisan bankruptcy-reform bill, although many expect it to 
be enacted at some point in the near future. At the same time, 
WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, and their ignominious peers con­
tinue to set records for the size, expense, and public attention drawn 
to business bankruptcy. For the first time, consumer bankruptcies 
surpassed the 1.5 million per year mark, continuing an irresistible 
upward trend. Meanwhile, law firms announce layoffs and salary 
freezes in most departments, and bankruptcy professionals prosper 
amidst the despair, billing $1 million per day on the Enron case alone 
- even as creditors and shareholders sit by awaiting payment. Clearly 
we are witnessing a profound and unprecedented change in the politi­
cal, social, and economic framework of bankruptcy. 
How did we get here and where are we headed? These are the 
questions brilliantly addressed by David A. Skeel, Jr.,1 in Debt's 
Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America. Told with a 
sound understanding of theory and law, and an eye for detail, Skeel's 
book is an instant classic - a comprehensive and intriguing history of 
bankruptcy law in America. But to characterize the book as "history" 
is to slight its reach and importance. In a concise and readable 250 
pages, Skeel brings to life not only the political and economic history 
of bankruptcy law, but also the fascinating history of the bankruptcy 
bar itself. Finally, Skeel deftly leads the reader through the fundamen­
tal theoretical debates that have shaped bankruptcy law during the 
past century, including the contentious intellectual debates between 
"Progressive" academic theorists and their rivals from the "Law and 
Economics School." Skeel has written a book that will serve as both 
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the definitive work on the history of bankruptcy law for bankruptcy 
experts as well as a comprehensive guide on the development of the 
modern American bankruptcy system for the interested generalist in 
law or business. 
This Review considers the past, present, and future of bankruptcy 
law through the lens of Skeel's analysis. Part I provides an overview of 
Skeel's historical thesis, including the novel theoretical methods he 
uses to advance his analysis. Part II examines the current state of 
bankruptcy law, focusing particularly on the political and economic 
battles involving bankruptcy reform during the past several years. Part 
III considers Skeel's predictions as to the future evolution of bank­
ruptcy law and practice in America and abroad. 
I. THE PAST: THE HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 
Skeel divides the history of bankruptcy law in America into three 
historical stages: the nineteenth century, the era of the 1898 Bank­
ruptcy Act and the Great Depression, and the modern era of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code. As Skeel notes, the shape of bankruptcy law and 
practice throughout American. history is at least as much a result of 
political considerations and influence as economic considerations. To 
develop his point, Skeel draws on the fields of public choice and social 
choice, both of which apply the assumptions and tools of economics to 
the study of politics. Skeel uses these tools to shape his narrative, 
giving his argument an analytical edge that prior historical studies of 
American bankruptcy law lacked.2 In particular, American bankruptcy 
law can be understood as resulting from the clash of three sets of 
interests: prodebtor ideological interests (often spearheaded by law 
professors), creditor interests, and bankruptcy professionals; interests 
(including bankruptcy judges). Although the outcome of this three­
way political wrestling match is unclear at any given moment, the 
dominant course of evolution of American bankruptcy law has been 
towards increasingly generous bankruptcy laws that provide strong 
incentives for both individual and corporate debtors to file bank­
ruptcy. 
A. Bankruptcy Legislation in the Nin.eteenth Century 
The first era of American bankruptcy legislation was rooted in the 
Constitution's enumeration of Congress's power to "establish uniform 
laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."3 
Like the other economic provisions of the Constitution, the primary 
2. The classic study is CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 
(1935). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I ,§  8, cl. 4. 
2018 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2016 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Clause was to rein in the prodebtor 
excesses of state legislatures under the Articles of Confederation.4 
Under the Articles of Confederation, creditors confronted numerous 
obstacles to their attempts to collect judgments, including judgment­
jumping from one state to another and efforts by some states to 
discharge obligations owed by debtors, primarily at the expense of 
out-of-state creditors.5 According to James Madison, regulation of 
bankruptcy was "intimately connected with the regulation of com­
merce, and [would] prevent so many frauds where the parties or their 
property may lie or be removed into different states that the expedi­
ency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question."6 Subject to 
these powers designed to augment the ability of creditors to recover 
judgments, most debtor-creditor relations remained governed by state 
law, an allocation of power that continues today. 
During the nineteenth century, the federal government enacted 
three bankruptcy laws prior to the 1898 Act: the Bankruptcy Acts of 
1800, 1841, and 1867 (p. 25). Each act was spawned amidst a financial 
crisis and was repealed soon thereafter. The 1800 Act lasted only three 
years, the 1841 Act lasted only two years, and the 1867 Act was 
repealed eleven years later. All together, therefore, these three acts 
lasted a total of sixteen years. In the intervening periods, debtor­
creditor relations remained wholly the province of state law. Skeel 
demonstrates that this federal instability resulted from "legislative 
cycling," a phenomenon identified by economists and political scien­
tists that can arise where lawmakers hold three or more positions 
which cannot be aligned on a simple linear spectrum of choices (p. 28). 
Skeel identifies three different positions with respect to bankruptcy, 
each identified with a particular region of the country, and each with 
approximately equal political support. As a result of these tensions, 
bankruptcy legislation was enacted only in periods of crisis, receding 
soon afterwards. Even then, it was often necessary to engage in politi­
cal logrolling in order to fashion a majority. Given the regional nature 
of the American economy for most of the nineteenth century, 
however, there was little need for national bankruptcy legislation in 
most circumstances, leaving debtor-creditor relations largely in the 
hands of state governments. 
4. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Bankruptcy Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2003). 
5. Thus, although conventional wisdom has it that the Bankruptcy Clause of the Consti­
tution was a protection for debtors, it was primarily the reverse. Indeed, many states main­
tained imprisonment for debt well into the nineteenth century. Id. 
6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
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B. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Great Depression 
The decades following the Civil War saw an increasing nationaliza­
tion of the American economy, spurred by advances in communica­
tions and transportation technology, such as railroads, electricity, the 
air brake, the elevator, and the steam boiler.7 Millions of Americans 
left rural farms for urban factories, accompanied by millions more new 
immigrants.8 The number of factories nearly quadrupled from 140,000 
in 1865 to 5 12,000 in 1900, and the size of factories grew even more 
rapidly.9 Between 1870 and 1900 the nationwide rail network grew 
from 53,000 to 193,000 miles.10 Accompanying the rise of the national 
economy, a host of new special-interest groups arose to represent an 
interstate constituency.11 
Skeel focuses on the large number of commercial organizations 
founded during this period, arguing that they provided the impetus 
that eventually led to the 1898 Bankruptcy Act (p. 35). In particular, 
the overlay of an emerging national economy onto a state-based sys­
tem of debt collection created numerous problems. "Merchants who 
engaged in interstate commerce complained bitterly and repeatedly 
that debtors played favorites when they ran into financial trouble," he 
writes, adding that, "[t]he favorites were family members and local 
creditors, not the out-of-state merchants" (p. 36). 
The primary impetus for the 1898 Act, therefore, was the efforts of 
creditors to develop more streamlined procedures for debt collection, 
especially on interstate debts. But Skeel notes two anomalies of the 
1898 Act as finally enacted: first, the primary beneficiaries of the Act 
were bankruptcy lawyers rather than creditors, and second, the 1898 
Act turned out to be much more debtor-friendly than originally 
anticipated (p. 43). As Skeel observes of the finished product, "[t]hese 
characteristics - the generally debtor-friendly approach to bank­
ruptcy, and the primacy of lawyers rather than an administrator -
distinguish U.S. bankruptcy law from every other insolvency law in the 
world" (p. 43). 
The lawyer-friendly and debtor-friendly characteristics of the 
1898 Act have distinguished American bankruptcy law ever since. 
Moreover, they served to end the century of legislative cycling that 
7. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 368 (2000). 
8. Id. at 370-71. 
9. Id. at 368-69. 
10. Id. at 369. 
11. See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Sev­
enteenth Amendment and its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 165, 179 (1997); Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice 
Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007 (1994). 
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had undone previous bankruptcy laws. The debtor-friendly nature 
created by the 1898 Act reflected the rise of an American populist 
ideology that continues to permeate the bankruptcy debates today. 
Although lawyers did not provide the impetus for the 1898 Act, they 
"came out of the woodwork to fill the need" created by the new law 
(p. 43). This created an entrenched and well-organized constituency 
who would benefit from the perpetuation of the law and therefore 
could be counted on to oppose any future repeal or major innovations, 
thereby ending legislative cycling in Congress.1 2  
The 1898 Act remained in place until supplanted by the 1978 Code. 
During this period, however, bankruptcy law and practice were 
certainly not static. The invention of equity receiverships as a judicial 
procedure to reorganize the railroads at the turn of the century, the 
intervention of the Great Depression, and William 0. Douglas's high­
profile hearings while Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") are also among the pivotal incidents recounted 
by Skeel. From this economic and political process emerged the 
Chandler Act amendments to the Act, which increased governmental 
oversight of the bankruptcy process. Although space limits the ability 
to discuss these developments in detail here, these developments 
resulted in prestigious Wall Street law firms abandoning their bank­
ruptcy practices. At the same time, ordinary bankruptcy lawyers 
remained unscathed, and in many ways richer and more influential 
than ever before. 
C. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code 
By the 1970s, the creaky construct of the 1898 Act was ripe for 
overhaul. Again the impetus came from creditors who were frustrated 
with the rising number of personal bankruptcy filings during the 1950s 
and 1960s. Individual filings rose from 25,040 in 1950 to 178,202 in 
1970 (p. 137). Although trivial by modern standards, at the time this 
rise sparked concern. Nonetheless, creditors once again lost control of 
the process they initiated, as the bar again seized the reins of the 
reform effort. By the time the process was over, both personal and 
business bankruptcy laws were made more lax rather than strict. Skeel 
documents a series of bankruptcy "scope expanding" reforms that 
resulted in increased bankruptcy filings (both personal and business), 
as well as a more expansive role generally for bankruptcy law in the 
American economy and society (pp. 147-51). In addition, the 1978 
Code brought Wall Street lawyers and banks back into bankruptcy 
practice by increasing fees, increasing prestige, and further weakening 
public oversight of the process by elimination of the SEC's oversight 
12. See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 259, 268-
72 (1999). 
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role. The end result was to reinvigorate professional control of bank­
ruptcy proceedings and professional influence in Congress. As Skeel 
notes, ideology was muted throughout the process that culminated in 
the 1978 Code, leading to a belief that bankruptcy was primarily a 
"technical" process best left to the "experts" - namely, bankruptcy 
professionals (p. 141). Wrapped in the veneer of expertise, bankruptcy 
professionals further entrenched their influence over bankruptcy 
proceedings and legislation, fending off efforts to retrench the scope 
or expense of either personal or business bankruptcy. As Bruce 
Carruthers and Terence Halliday observe in their study of the 1978 
Code, following its enactment "bankruptcy professionals experienced 
a meteoric rise in their professional identity, their market position, 
and the rewards accompanying both."13 Similarly, Congressman 
Robert Drinan observed during the debates over the 1978 Code that it 
amounted to a "  'full employment bill' for lawyers."14 
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code profoundly changed the bankruptcy 
system and its importance in society and the economy. By making 
bankruptcy more attractive to individuals, personal bankruptcies rose 
from less than 300,000 in 1980 to over 1.5 million in 2002.15 By making 
bankruptcy more attractive for corporations as well, it routinized 
corporate bankruptcy, turning it into a business and strategic decision 
rather than a last resort. The wealth and prominence of bankruptcy 
professionals rose as well, as they escaped the unsavory ghetto in 
which they toiled for decades after the New Deal reforms. Today, the 
largest and most prestigious law firms, investment banks, accounting 
firms, and consultants in America have thriving bankruptcy practices, 
representing all interests in the bankruptcy system, including debtors. 
And although piecemeal reforms enacted in 1984 reined in some of 
the excesses of the 1978 Code, they did little to stem the rising tide of 
consumer-bankruptcy filings or to reduce the expense and delay asso­
ciated with the chapter 11 process. 
D. The Lessons of History 
The 1898 Act thus set in place the three political interests that have 
shaped American bankruptcy law from 1898, through the 1978 Code, 
to the present: (1) creditor interests, (2) prodebtor interests (usually 
ideological, rather than particular), and (3) the interests of bankruptcy 
13. BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE 
MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 421 
(1998). 
14. Id. at 302 (quoting Congressman Robert Drinan (internal quotation marks omit­
ted)). 
15. ABI World, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2002, at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/ 
1980annual.html (last visited May 13, 2003). 
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professionals. As Skeel notes, however, "of all these groups, bank­
ruptcy professionals are the ones who have most strongly influenced 
the shape of U.S. bankruptcy law in the century since its enactment in 
1898" (p. 81 ). This is because, compared to other interest groups, 
bankruptcy lawyers are relatively better positioned than other interest 
groups to influence the legislative process. It is important to keep in 
mind that interest-group influence is a matter of relative influence, not 
absolute influence.16 Thus, in general, even if interest-group A is less­
organized than interest-group B, A will still be favored in the political 
process relative to even more dispersed and unorganized groups, 
except for the rare situation where A's and B's positions are squarely 
opposed. In general, however, gains to trade are available among 
interest groups such that comparatively well-organized interest groups 
can form alliances to provide shared benefits to themselves and to 
impose the costs on the unorganized public. 17 Following Mancur 
Olson, Skeel observes that an interest group's influence is primarily a 
function of how homogeneous, coherent, politically-savvy, and well­
organized the group is. 
Public choice analysis illuminates why bankruptcy lawyers have 
proven such a potent lobbying force. Bankruptcy lawyers have clear 
goals - to increase the number of bankruptcies filed and the expense 
of each. Regardless whether a particular lawyer represents debtors, 
creditors, or both, the fact remains that bankruptcy lawyers can make 
money only if individuals and corporations file bankruptcy. Thus, 
bankruptcy lawyers generally will seek to increase both the number of 
bankruptcy cases filed and the expense of bankruptcy proceedings. 
This also means that even though debtors and potential debtors are 
not directly represented in the bankruptcy process, their interests are 
usually well-represented by bankruptcy attorneys who will lobby for 
open access to bankruptcy for debtors. Moreover, the highly technical 
and complex nature of bankruptcy law and practice increases the 
leverage of lawyers in the legislative process both by making their 
expertise an essential part of the legislative process and making it 
more difficult for the public and lawmakers to monitor their special­
interest influence on particular provisions that may seem unimportant 
but can have a vast impact on a lawyer's wealth (p. 87). This technical 
expertise further heightens the influence of lawyers when lawmakers 
move from issues of broad principle to technical legislative drafting (p. 
46). 
Although creditors have clear interest in the content of bankruptcy 
laws, they suffer several problems in exercising political influence 
16. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Po­
litical Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 874-87 
(1999). 
17. See id. 
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when compared to bankruptcy professionals.18 First, many creditors, 
such as trade creditors, are simply too hard to organize into an effec­
tive lobbying group because of their large numbers and the small stake 
each has in changing the law. Second, unlike bankruptcy lawyers, the 
interests of creditors are not homogeneous, creating collective-action 
problems. Because a debtor by definition is unable to pay his debts, 
secured creditors and unsecured creditors usually are locked in a zero­
sum game regarding distribution of the debtor's estate. A bigger slice 
for secured creditors means less for unsecured creditors, and vice­
versa. Third, to the extent that unsecured credit becomes more risky 
because of easy access to bankruptcy, unsecured credit raises the cost 
of unsecured credit and creates a market substitution toward greater 
use of secured credit.19 Thus, secured creditors will have little concern 
about the overall number of bankruptcy filings or the amounts distrib­
uted, although they will care about specific issues that affect them, 
such as cramdown and valuation issues.20 
The incentive for creditors to lobby for changes in the bankruptcy 
system will also be mitigated by the fact that any gains will be tempo­
rary. Tightening bankruptcy laws to reduce risk retroactively creates a 
one-time opportunity to earn economic profits, but competition and 
entry into the market will dissipate those profits, returning all lenders 
to a competitive equilibrium. Creditors are able to pass along some of 
their losses to borrowers who repay their debts - "repayers" - in the 
form of higher downpayments, higher interest rates, and reduced 
benefits (p. 82). Because this mitigates some of the creditors' losses, 
this further reduces creditors' incentives to lobby for tighter bank­
ruptcy laws. Repayers face even more daunting obstacles to making 
their voices heard - given the small cost borne by each repayer as a 
result of excessive bankruptcies, each has minimal incentive to try to 
influence the legislative process. Moreover, repayers have no effective 
proxy representative for their interests, unlike bankruptcy filers who 
can count on bankruptcy lawyers to aggressively advance their inter­
ests in the political process. 
The final influence on the bankruptcy process is the tradition of 
prodebtor, populist, and progressive ideology in American politics. 
These bankruptcy "progressives" view bankruptcy as an economic and 
social safety valve to redistribute wealth to the poor and to preserve 
18. See Todd J. Zywicki, Rescuing Business: The Making of Corporate Bankruptcy Law 
in England and the United States, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 361, 387-88 (2000) (hereinafter Zy­
wicki, Rescuing Business] (book review) . 
19. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 125-26 
(2000). 
20. Cramdown and valuation issues are of particular interest to creditors because they 
affect the valuation of the creditor's collateral and thus how much can be recovered in bank­
ruptcy. See Todd J. Zywicki, Cramdown and the Code: Calculating Cramdown Interest Rates 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 251 (1994). 
2024 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:2016 
struggling businesses. Skeel also notes the major involvement of bank­
ruptcy law professors in the legislative process, such as Harvard's Vern 
Countryman,21 usually articulating a prodebtor ideological perspective 
(p. 194). Finally, so-called "consumer advocates" such as Ralph Nader 
have also tended to favor expansion of access to the bankruptcy 
system on populist principle, even though easy bankruptcy access only 
benefits the small class of bankrupt consumers, not the larger class of 
consumers who repay their debts and thereby subsidize those who file 
bankruptcy. As Skeel notes, this progressive ideology has greatly 
influenced the shape of American bankruptcy legislation (p. 16). 
Thus, the history of American bankruptcy legislation is not 
surprising. Reform efforts are initiated in the rare instances when 
creditors are able to overcome their collective-action problems and 
progressive ideological opposition to push for reforms. Once the proc­
ess commences, however, both the process and the technical drafting 
of legislation are soon captured by lawyers. In the end, lawyers usually 
manage to sidetrack the reforms that were originally sought and 
instead end up turning the legislation to their own advantage. 
II. THE PRESENT: THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 2002 
Skeel's analysis helps to unravel the politics surrounding the bank­
ruptcy-reform efforts of recent years, including the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 2002 ("BRA"), which just failed in the last Congress. 
The reform efforts were initiated in 1994, when Congress authorized a 
new commission, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
("NBRC"), to conduct a study of bankruptcy law and to recommend 
changes (p. 187). Modeled after the 1973 Commission, the NBRC was 
charged with reviewing the Code and recommending changes and 
updates. The bankruptcy world had certainly changed dramatically in 
the intervening years between the passage of the 1978 Code and the 
formation of the NBRC in 1994. In 1978, there were 172,423 nonbusi­
ness bankruptcy filings (p. 188) . By 1994, the consumer-bankruptcy 
filing rate had quadrupled to almost 800,000 annually, and has almost 
doubled again since then (p. 188). Moreover, the rise of leveraged buy 
outs, junk bonds, and mass-tort litigation had all changed business 
bankruptcy substantially. 
Unlike the 1973 Commission, however, the NBRC's deliberations 
and conclusions were highly divisive and controversial, especially 
regarding consumer-bankruptcy issues. As Skeel writes, "In its 
consumer recommendations, the 1994 commission's report took a 
21. Countryman began his career in the 1950s as a defender of alleged communist sym­
pathizers and became an outspoken and politically active prodebtor lobbyist through the 
1960s and 1970s, playing a pivotal role in shaping the debtor-friendly provisions of the 1978 
Code. P. 194. 
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prodebtor cast, firmly rejecting calls to tighten the bankruptcy laws 
and vigorously defending consumer debtors' right to an immediate 
discharge. Consumer creditors were less than enthusiastic with the 
process" (p. 187). NBRC reporter and Harvard Law School professor 
Elizabeth Warren, the acknowledged leader of the modern bank­
ruptcy progressives, excluded contrary views and orchestrated a set of 
recommendations that advanced the unique perspectives of its leaders 
(p. 201). 
Despite the "blue ribbon" composition of the NBRC, its idiosyn­
cratic ideological orientation guaranteed that its recommendations 
would be dead on arrival when presented to Congress in 1996. Unsur­
prisingly, when Congress actually turned to the task of reforming the 
bankruptcy laws, it moved in the direction of trying to tighten the 
laws, rather than loosening them. 
Launched with fanfare, the NBRC had at its disposal ample finan­
cial, intellectual, and political resources. Nonetheless, the NBRC 
process quickly ran off the rails of moderation and compromise, 
producing a one-sided and politically stillborn product. Instead of 
following the Commission's prodebtor recommendations, Congress 
immediately proposed a bankruptcy-reform bill that tightened the 
bankruptcy laws by weeding out fraud and abuse in consumer cases 
and enacting reforms designed to reduce the cost and delay of small­
business bankruptcies. Skeel asks, "How did so much dysfunction 
come from a commission who innocuous-sounding charge was to look 
for ways to perfect a generally adequate framework?" (p. 198). In 
addition, why were the political dynamics in this situation so strongly 
oriented toward reform that bankruptcy-reform efforts appear to be 
able to overcome the traditional obstacles that had prevented 
comprehensive reform in the past? 
In part, both the NBRC's ·dysfunction and the BRA's proposed 
reforms occurred because of the different ideological orientations of 
the NBRC and Congress during the 1990s. In contrast to the leftward 
tilt of the NBRC and its leaders, the Republican takeover of Congress 
in 1994 made the Washington political environment turn much more 
ideologically conservative, leading to a political and intellectual envi­
ronment that was decidedly unfriendly to the NBRC's prodebtor 
recommendations (p. 199). Skeel attributes this distinction to the 
academic debate between "progressive"· scholars on one hand and 
"law and economics" scholars on the other. Although there is much 
truth to this analysis, I believe it is incomplete. Based on my personal 
experience as an advisor to Congress for the past several years on 
bankruptcy reform, I believe that Congress is animated by a new 
political ideology of "personal responsibility" that serves as a coun-
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terweight to the traditional prodebtor ideology.22 Although it overlaps 
in many ways with law and economics ideas, there is much in the 
personal responsibility ideology that is not captured by the "law and 
economics" label, which connotes an overriding concern with eco­
nomic efficiency. The personal responsibility ideology sees consumer 
bankruptcy as primarily a moral issue, rather than an economic issue. 
To be sure, personal-responsibility and law-and-economics arguments 
often reinforce one another, as much of the personal-responsibility 
rhetoric stresses the injustice of forcing responsible consumers to sub­
sidize the recklessness of profligate borrowers. But the distinction is 
deeper than just economics: soaring consumer-bankruptcy filing rates 
viewed as a crisis of the American soul, rather than a mere matter of 
economic policy. Put simply, there is no economic explanation for the 
upsurge in individual bankruptcy filings in the late 1990s, an era of 
unprecedented prosperity, low interest rates, low unemployment rates, 
and soaring levels of individual wealth. Given the anomaly of eco­
nomic prosperity combined with the staggering rise in bankruptcy 
filings, many have concluded that the problem is social and spiritual, 
rather than economic.23 
This focus on an ideology of personal responsibility is evident in 
the debates surrounding bankruptcy reform. Consider the comments 
of House Majority Leader Richard Armey: 
Bankruptcy laws in America have put a lie to one of the most important 
lessons we teach our children. Bankruptcy laws in America have said to 
our children, you are a fool if you do not file. That is not right. ... It is 
not about the money. Anybody who thinks this bill is about who gets the 
money is missing the point. ... This bill is about the character of a Nation 
and will the Nation's laws have a character of the Nation's people.24 
House Judiciary Chairman James Sensenbrenner similarly remarks, 
"The purpose of the bill is to improve bankruptcy law and practice by 
restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy 
system, and to ensure that the system is fair to both debtors and 
creditors."25 When the BRA was reported out of the Conference 
Committee in July 2002, Senator Orrin Hatch compared it to recent 
corporate responsibility initiatives, stating, ''In these hard economic 
times, while we're dealing with corporate responsibility, we should 
22. This political emphasis on personal responsibility is evident in many other areas as 
well, including most notably, welfare reform. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social 
Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 430 (2001) [hereinafter Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as 
Social Legislation]. 
23. See id. at 428-29. 
24. 147 CONG. REC. H518 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Armey). 
25. 147 CONG. REC. H517 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). 
May 2003] Bankruptcy Law 2027 
also address personal responsibility."26 Many liberal leaders have 
embraced the moral argument in favor of bankruptcy reform, such as 
Democratic Congressman Barney Frank, who says, "I think people 
should have to pay their bills. . . . I am for toughening bankruptcy 
laws. It's only a minority who ever go bankrupt, and those costs 
get passed on to the majority who pay their bills."27 Although 
economic analysis is entwined in the values argument, much of 
Congress's interest in consumer-bankruptcy reform is rooted in 
values-based concerns over personal and financial responsibility.28 
Personal bankruptcy is part of a larger set of concerns over the moral 
character of the nation, its leaders, and the negative impact of rampant 
breaking of one's financial promises on reliability, trust, and reciproc­
ity in other aspects of life.29 
Nesting bankruptcy into a larger social and ideological framework 
regarding personal responsibility and morality has altered the political 
balance regarding bankruptcy. According to Douglass North, the 
power of ideology in political decisionmaking is that it helps to over­
come collective-action and free-rider problems and thus to motivate 
action in the face of concentrated interest-group pressures.30 Nonpro­
gressives have traditionally viewed bankruptcy in technical rather than 
ideological terms, leaving no articulate philosophical counterweight to 
the progressives. The development of a personal-responsibility ideol­
ogy in Congress has offset the progressives' traditional advantage, 
creating a shift in the baseline presumptions for Congress as to the 
appropriate direction for reforms. Ideological voting by politicians 
also tends to be most pronounced on issues of low public salience, of 
which bankruptcy appears to be such an issue.31 The conservative 
takeover of Congress in 1994, therefore, effected an ideological shift in 
Congress that created a momentum for stricter bankruptcy laws 
anchored in notions of personal responsibility, rather than for the pro­
debtor reforms favored by the NBRC. This counteroffensive must 
have surprised the NBRC leaders - whereas previous progressive 
initiatives had met with minimal ideological opposition, this time the 
26. Editorial, Bankruptcy Reform Nears: People Who Can Repay Debts Should Be Re­
quired to Do So, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 26, 2002, at 128 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
27. Anne E. Kornblut, Credit Card Issuers Seek to Curb Debtors' Bankruptcy Relief, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1999, at Al. 
28. See Todd J. Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape: A Response to Professor Alexan­
der, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 613 (2000) [hereinafter Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape]. 
29. See Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, supra note 22, at 412-13. 
30. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 51-58 
(1981). 
31. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory 
of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984). 
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NBRC's recommendations met with fierce ideological opposition from 
Congress. 
The Republican takeover of Congress also dramatically affected 
the interest-group balance in Congress, weakening the traditional 
hammerlock exercised by bankruptcy lawyers. When the NBRC was 
constituted, it was generally believed that its influence would be simi­
lar to that of the lawyer-dominated National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission of the 1970s, which had exercised comprehensive control 
over the drafting of the 1978 Code. The Commission of the 1970s 
effectively served as a "private legislature," exercising agenda control 
throughout the entire legislative process that culminated in the 1978 
Code. It was generally believed that the NBRC of the 1990s would 
have a similar influence. As commentators have observed, these 
"private legislatures" exhibit many of the same interest-group and 
public-choice influences as traditional legislatures.32 In fact, because of 
the undemocratic composition of these groups, their narrow scope, 
and their low public profile, these private law-reform groups often 
exhibit even deeper pathologies than public legislatures.33 As noted 
above, lawyers and progressive ideologues share a common interest in 
the expansion of the role of bankruptcy. Given the prodebtor ideo­
logical orientation of the NBRC and the strong agenda control exer­
cised by its leaders, the interests and influence of bankruptcy lawyers 
was highly magnified, much more so than in a public legislature. 
Given the obvious stake of lawyers in the reform process, the 
receptive attitude of the NBRC's leaders to the influence of lawyers is 
striking. Professor Warren, the NBRC reporter, has criticized the 
attempts of creditors to influence the NBRC's hearings, longing 
instead for the days when creditors and other interested parties left 
bankruptcy law up to the experts "who spent their professional lives in 
the field, advising Congress either through the National Bankruptcy 
Conference or later as part of the National Conference of Bankruptcy 
Judges. Those days have passed. "34 Elsewhere she observes of the 
NBRC: 
The interests of the lobbyists and their collateral acquaintances came as a 
surprise, but it should not have. Long past were the days when Frank 
Kennedy could meet with Larry King, Joe Lee, Conrad Cyr, Vern Coun­
tryman, Gerry Smith and a handful of other people to work out the basic 
32. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 607-08 (1995). To be sure, there are some differences as well as 
similarities between the NBRC and other private legislatures. Unfortunately, space con­
straints prevent a more detailed comparison. 
33. Id. 
34. Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in 
Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5. 
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structure of the 1973 Commission recommendations on consumer bank­
ruptcy.35 
Whereas creditors and other interested parties were dismissed as 
special-interest pleaders, bankruptcy lawyers and judges were viewed 
as disinterested experts, notwithstanding the vital financial stake that 
they had in the outcome of the NBRC process. This dichotomy is 
absurd, but to the extent that key NBRC decisionmakers actually 
embraced a "white hat" versus "black hat" characterization of rival 
interest groups, it may account for some of the dovetailing of lawyer 
and ideological interests in the NBRC process. In turn, various organi­
zations· of bankruptcy professionals provided major financial support 
to progressive scholars whose research coincidentally tends to support 
the positions advocated by the bankruptcy bar.36 
In the end, the NBRC recommendations comprised a veritable 
"wish list" of the positions favored by the bankruptcy bar. Although 
the NBRC's recommendations covered a vast scope, they almost 
uniformly increased the power, prestige, and wealth of bankruptcy 
lawyers and judges. For example, the recommendations included such 
items as prohibitions against prebankruptcy waivers of bankruptcy 
rights in chapter 11 cases (such as waiver of the right to file bank­
ruptcy or waiver of the automatic stay), Article III status for bank­
ruptcy judges, recommendations for greater use of bankruptcy to 
resolve mass tort issues, and numerous recommendations in the 
consumer area that increased the incentives to file bankruptcy.37 
Bankruptcy professionals also lobbied intently against the BRA in 
Congress, and while successful at delaying reform, they were unable to 
defeat it. In the end, opponents of reform have so far been able to 
count on only 20-25% of Congress to oppose reform. Moreover, even 
this meager figure includes the votes of those who voted against the 
BRA not based on ideology or interest-group solidarity regarding its 
35. Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 483, 488 (1977). 
36. See The Endowment for Education of the National Conference of Bankruptcy 
Judges, at http://www.ncbj.org/endowrpt02.htm (last visited May 19, 2003) (listing recipients 
of grants from the NCBJ Endowment for Education). A highly-publicized study critical of 
the impact of means-testing was funded by the American Bankruptcy Institute, another or­
ganization of bankruptcy professionals. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, 
Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 
Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27 (1999). The conclusions of that study rest on an 
erroneous understanding of how the budget allowances for means-testing would be calcu­
lated. See Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU 
L. REV. 177, 187-88. 
37. For instance, bankruptcy lawyers attempted to force through a recommendation to 
weaken the disinterestedness requirement, but the initial vote on the effort to do so was later 
reconsidered after it drew substantial opposition from other members of the Commission. 
The incident is described in Todd J. Zywicki, Mend It, Don't End It: The Case for Retaining 
the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possession's Professionals, 18 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 291 (1998). 
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core provisions, but because of opposition on tangential issues such as 
proposed limits on the homestead exemption or the "Schumer 
Amendment" relating to nondischargeability of civil judgments 
imposed on abortion-clinic protesters. Many of these members, espe­
cially conservatives from Texas and Florida, clearly supported the core 
provisions of the BRA. In the end, therefore, the only substantive 
opposition to bankruptcy reform came from the extreme prodebtor 
fringe of the ideological spectrum and politicians who were especially 
beholden to financial contributions by lawyers.38 Despite these intense 
lobbying efforts, bankruptcy professionals have been unable to repli­
cate their previous successes in turning the reform process to their 
advantage. Although a final reckoning of the reasons why will require 
further study in the future, my personal experience suggests two 
reasons why this was the case. 
First, the Republican takeover of Congress not only changed the 
ideological orientation of Congress, it also dramatically changed the 
political balance. Lawyers are simply less influential and less friendly 
with Republicans than with Democrats, especially in the Judiciary 
Committees, which traditionally have been the private playground for 
lawyers. The overwhelming majority of lawyers' political contributions 
flow to Democratic politicians.39 Moreover, on many important issues 
including tort reform, the Republican legislative agenda is fiercely 
opposed by a core Democratic constituency of lawyers. Given this 
history, special-interest pleading by lawyers generally is less well 
received by Republican congresses than by their Democratic prede­
cessors. 
Second, early on in the legislative process bankruptcy lawyers 
undermined their own credibility through a strategy of confrontation 
and confusion, rather than constructive participation in the reform 
process. Instead of offering constructive influence on the process, 
bankruptcy professionals instead launched a full-frontal assault against 
the BRA and its alleged political motivations. The purpose of 
the strategy apparently was to delay the BRA in the hopes of a 
Democratic takeover of Congress in the 1998 election cycle, which did 
not occur. Nonetheless, their aggressive rhetoric did stall reform, 
thereby emboldening the strategy. From that point on, bankruptcy 
professionals committed themselves to a slash-and-burn rhetorical and 
38. Congressman Jerrold Nadler spearheaded opposition to the BRA in the House; 
Senators Paul Wellstone and Edward Kennedy did so in the Senate. Each of the three have 'received thousands of dollars of campaign contributions from lawyers, and lawyers are 
among the top two or three contributors to their campaigns. Senator Kennedy alone re­
ceived over one million dollars from lawyers and lobbyists in his last Senate election. See 
http://www.opensecrets.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2003); see also Zywicki, With Apologies to 
Screwtape, supra note 28, at 626 n.68 (elaborating on financial contributions in the context of 
bankruptcy reform). 
39. See Zywicki, With Apologies tu Screwtape, supra note 28, at 626 n.68. 
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political strategy that quickly eroded their support on Capitol Hill. 
False charges about the purported negative effect of the BRA on 
women, children, poor, and infirm successfully spawned confusion and 
delayed reform in the short run, but in the long run the strategy has 
proven self-defeating. It soon became difficult to distinguish the bar's 
legitimate criticisms from posturing and obstructionism, and blatant 
factual errors coupled with a hard-edged rhetorical strategy eventually 
undermined the trustworthiness of bankruptcy professionals. In 
the end, this squandered the one traditional source of professional 
influence - their purported provision of nonpartisan technical advice 
to Congress. 
Which raises the third group of interests in Skeel's trinity - credi­
tors. Much has been said and written about the influence of creditors 
in lobbying for the BRA, and while most of it is overblown, there is a 
kernel of truth in the fact that for the first time in recent memory 
creditors as a group have been able to overcome their collective-action 
problems to lobby effectively for their interests. In part, this greater 
political organization reflects the greater incentives of creditors to do 
something in the face of millions of bankruptcy filings and the billions 
of dollars in discharged debts caused by them. As the benefits of 
action (or the costs to be averted) rise, parties will be willing to invest 
greater amounts to organize to capture those benefits.40 But more 
fundamentally, the greater ability of creditors to organize regarding 
the BRA reflects the fact that unlike previous reform efforts, the 
benefits-of the BRA are spread across many different classes of credi­
tors, thereby overcoming the intramural struggles that have crippled 
creditor efforts in the past. Unsecured creditors obtained such long­
sought provisions such as means-testing eligibility of debtors for chap­
ter 7 relief by creating a presumption for high-income debtors with 
substantial repayment capacity to file in chapter 13 instead of chapter 
7 unless they can demonstrate significant hardship.41 There are several 
new protections for secured creditors as well, such as rules limiting the 
cramdown of automobile loans and increased powers of mortgage 
creditors to respond to repeated bad-faith filings by debtors simply to 
stave off foreclosure. Even tax creditors were given new mechanisms 
for protecting their rights. Finally, marital-support creditors received 
several new protections that reduce the interference of bankruptcy 
with collection of alimony and child support obligations, as well as 
eliminating the incentives of debtors to file bankruptcy strategically to 
discharge certain marital obligations. Moreover, all creditors will 
benefit from reforms that increase debtor accountability by making 
40. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
41. The rationale and mechanism of means-testing is described in detail in Jones & 
Zywicki, supra note 36, at 181-207. · 
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debtors' repayment schedules more honest and limiting the ability of 
debtors to hide assets and understate income. As the fabric of the 1978 
Code has become increasingly tattered and debtors have become 
increasingly savvy about exploiting the loopholes in the Code, it has 
become possible for creditors to find common ground to lobby for 
reforms that benefit all classes of creditors. Political action by credi­
tors historically has been frustrated by the zero-sum nature of bank­
ruptcy - more money for secured creditors means less for unsecured 
creditors and vice-versa. Today, however, bankruptcy losses to all 
creditors are sufficiently large and widespread that all creditors have 
something to gain from reducing bankruptcy fraud and abuse, and as a 
result a coherent and stable coalition of creditors has been able to 
hold together for several years. 
While creditors were actively involved in the legislative process 
of the BRA, it is easy to overstate their influence. In a recent study, 
Stephen Nunez and Howard Rosenthal conclude that perhaps 15 of 
the 306 members' votes in the House in favor of the BRA in 2001 may 
have been swayed by campaign contributions from the consumer­
credit industry - about five percent of the House's 74% majority in 
favor of passage.42 Indeed, although Nunez and Rosenthal examine 
only the number of votes influenced by creditor contributions, it is 
probably the case that these votes were at least to some extent 
canceled out by lobbying by bankruptcy professionals against reform. 
The modest effect of lobbying by creditors and lawyers suggests that 
positions on the BRA were driven largely by the ideological debate 
between "pro-debtor" and "personal responsibility" advocates rather 
than political and financial calculation. In this, the BRA can be distin­
guished from the reform process of the 1978 Code. In 1978, the debate 
focused primarily on reforms to the chapter 11 process rather than on 
consumers. As a result, the debates were technocratic and interest­
group driven, allowing bankruptcy professionals to claim an upper 
hand in the process. By contrast, the core reforms in the BRA were 
driven by consumer-bankruptcy issues, an area with heavy ideological 
overtones. 
The three sets of influences that comprise the core of Skeel's 
analysis thus explain the probable success of the BRA, despite the 
efforts to derail it. First, an ideological shift in Congress following the 
1994 elections created a new constituency for an ideology rooted in 
personal responsibility, which manifested itself in a concern over 
soaring personal-bankruptcy filing rates during an era of unprece­
dented economic prosperity. This new ideological influence counter­
balanced the traditional prodebtor ideology that historically domi-
42. STEPHEN NUNEZ & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, BANKRUPTCY 'REFORM' CONGRESS: 
CREDITORS, COMMIITEES, IDEOLOGY, AND FLOOR VOTING IN THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS (Russell Sage Found., Working Paper No. 196, 2002). 
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nated ideological thinking about bankruptcy. Second, the interests of 
bankruptcy professionals were attenuated relative to prior eras. In 
part, this was because the new Republican majority was less respon­
sive than Democrats were to the interests of lawyers. In addition, early 
on in the reform process bankruptcy professionals committed them­
selves to a crude and partisan rhetorical and political strategy that 
sacrificed the· one source of influence that they were able to claim in 
the past - the provision of constructive nonideological technical 
advice. Third, creditors were able to overcome their traditional collec­
tive-action problems and thereby patch together a set of reforms that 
would satisfy creditors from across the spectrum: secured, unsecured, 
marital support, and even government creditors. Thus a combination 
of factors congealed to create an environment rich for bankruptcy 
reform: a less debtor-oriented ideological environment, weakened 
influence by bankruptcy.professionals, and strengthened influence by 
creditors. In this environment, therefore, the overwhelming and 
bipartisan support for bankruptcy reform in both houses of Congress 
was not surprising. Although reform has failed thus far, it is expected 
eventually. 
III. THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
In the final chapters of the book,  Skeel reviews many of the 
current "hot topics" in bankruptcy law and policy and offers predic­
tions about the future of bankruptcy law, both domestically and inter­
nationally. Of particular interest is the impact of globalization on the 
future evolution of American bankruptcy law. Skeel concludes that 
globalization will have minimal impact on the structure of American 
bankruptcy law. "Although the new, world economy will have impor­
tant effects," he writes, "the basic parameters of American bankruptcy 
law are unlikely to change. We will continue to see the same three 
forces - creditors, prodebtor ideology, and bankruptcy professionals 
- and the shape of the bankruptcy process will remain roughly the 
same" (p. 241). In particular, Skeel observes, despite the many criti­
cisms of American bankruptcy law, under the pressures of globaliza­
tion, bankruptcy law in much of the world is evolving to look more 
like the American bankruptcy system, rath_er than less (p. 241). On 
both business bankruptcy and consumer bankruptcy, the rest of the 
world is loosening its bankruptcy laws (p. 241). Thus, even though 
other countries' bankruptcy laws generally remain stricter than in the 
United States, the direction is clear ---:-- they are moving toward more 
generous bankruptcy laws. 
The important point, however, is that all of the pressure unleashed by 
globalization is pushing in this direction. All around the world, other na­
tions are beginning to adopt some of the features of U.S. bankruptcy law. 
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There is little evidence of a trend in any other direction, in the United 
States or elsewhere. (p. 243) 
Although the rest of the world does seem to be moving toward 
more generous bankruptcy laws, in the United States there is in fact 
clear evidence of a countertrend as exemplified by the BRA. Not only 
does the BRA temper the prodebtor character of consumer bank­
ruptcy, it also streamlines business bankruptcies to reduce the cost and 
delay of the chapter 11 process. By contrast, there is no viable 
constituency for the adoption of the NBRC's prodebtor recommenda­
tions. In fact, as chapter 11 has increasingly become a refuge for 
scandal-plagued companies, public opinion seems to be turning against 
chapter 11. In addition, creditors are becoming increasingly ingenious 
in changing actual bankruptcy practice and devising nonlegislative 
contractual and other "self-help" mechanisms for effectively opting 
out of bankruptcy completely or for devising mechanisms to minimize 
the expense, risk, and delay of being entangled in America's bank­
ruptcy proceedings.43 These legislative and practice attempts to rein in 
the excesses of the American bankruptcy system manifest de jure and 
de facto trends toward a more restrictive bankruptcy regime in the 
United States. 
Therefore, globalization probably will not create a uniform trend 
toward American-style bankruptcy systems. Rather, the likely result 
will be global convergence of bankruptcy regimes. Regimes that are 
excessively prodebtor, such as the United States, will tend to become 
less so; regimes that are insufficiently prodebtor, such as Europe, will 
tend to liberalize. The effect of globalization will be to establish a 
process of competition in economic policy that will tend to reward 
countries that adopt efficient economic policies and punish those that 
do not.44 Within America's federalist system, competition among 
states has tended to produce convergence on efficient commercial and 
corporate law rules.45 Given the free flow of capital around the world 
today, it is likely that such pressures will increasingly shape corporate 
governance rules around the world. Excessively prodebtor regimes 
such as the United States will be forced to temper their excesses in 
order to remain competitive in the global environment while Europe 
and elsewhere will tend to liberalize in order to increase entrepreneur­
ship and capital development in their moribund economies. 
43. See John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bank­
ruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699 (2002). 
44. See John 0. McGinnis, In Praise of the Efficiency of Decentralized Traditions and 
Their Preconditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 523, 529-30 (1999). 
45. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniform­
ity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464 
(1996). 
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Additionally, globalization probably will have the unanticipated 
effect of weakening the prodebtpr ideology that has dominated 
American bankruptcy law during this century. Progressives defend 
chapter 11 as a mechanism for advancing social goals such as preserva­
tion of jobs and communities. This argument is questionable on its 
face, as inefficient chapter 11 reorganizations save incumbent busi­
nesses and jobs, but only at the cost of reducing the availability of 
capital for new entrepreneurs and the creation of new jobs elsewhere 
in the economy.46 More importantly, the attainment of these progres­
sive policies depends on the willingness of private creditors to subsi­
dize their attainment. There is strong evidence that creditors increas­
ingly are unwilling to bear this burden and, as a result, are already 
trying to opt out of the chapter 11 system. Globalization amplifies this 
reluctance, producing pressures toward the adoption of efficient eco­
nomic policies, whether tax, trade, securities, labor, or bankruptcy 
policies. In the past, creditors were forced to bear these costs of social 
engineering because of the difficulty of escaping the reach of national 
bankruptcy laws. Moreover, to the extent that social benefits were 
actually provided, creditors may have been more willing to subsidize 
inefficient reorganizations when the beneficiaries were other Ameri­
cans. 
In the modern world, however, capital is not tied to any particular 
country. Thus, it is far easier to escape the "tax" imposed by a nation's 
inefficient bankruptcy laws. It also is doubtful that international inves­
tors will allow American bankruptcy judges to redistribute their 
wealth to subsidize American workers and lawyers through chapter 
11. To the extent that chapter 11 raises the costs and risks of investing 
in America, international investors will direct their capital to more 
efficient markets. In short, the pressures on the United States to adopt 
more efficient bankruptcy laws are much greater than in the past. As 
chapter 11 hampers American competitiveness, policymakers will find 
it increasingly expensive to indulge the ideological desires of bank­
ruptcy progressives, thus their influence should wane. 
In the consumer-bankruptcy arena, the BRA reflects a similar 
trend in the direction of greater restrictions on access to bankruptcy. 
American society is gradually reestablishing traditional values in the 
wake of what Francis Fukuyama has dubbed "the Great Disruption" 
of the past several decades.47 Promiscuous consumer-bankruptcy laws 
were just one of the many social experiments of recent decades that 
have proven contrary to human nature and the needs of successful 
societies.48 The movement toward greater accountability in consumer 
46. See Zywicki, Rescuing Business, supra note 18, at 373-74. 
47. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE 
RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999). 
48. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, supra note 22, at 430-31. 
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bankruptcy represents a necessary step of social self-correction after a 
period of chaos and revolution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
David Skeel has written a brilliant and comprehensive book on the 
history of bankruptcy law in America. The use of cutting-edge analyti­
cal tools makes it possible for him to persuasively explain the history 
of American bankruptcy law, as well as to offer insightful predictions 
about the future evolution of bankruptcy law in America. It is 
certainly the most important book on bankruptcy law that has been 
published since Thomas Jackson's acclaimed The Logic and Limits of 
Bankruptcy. Given the prominence of bankruptcy in today's business 
and political headlines, this is a book that should gain a wide audience 
among bankruptcy specialists and commercial and corporate law 
generalists alike. 
